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By Rebecca Winninger, Senior Associate Research Lawyer, Lam Family Law*

School absenteeism has been in the news lately, as studies have shown a downward trend in attendance since the Covid-19 pandemic, and Ontario’s government has responded with policy changes aimed at keeping children in class.

Not surprisingly, school absenteeism comes up in the case law as well. But how much of a difference does it make in decisions around parenting time and decision-making? Recent case law demonstrates that chronic absences can be a material change in circumstances, and in some cases, warrant a reversal of primary care.

The Social and Academic Consequences of Chronic Absenteeism

Ontario courts have recognized that missing an inordinate amount of school can place a child at a disadvantage both academically and socially: Borsoi v. Mogg, 2017 ONCJ 112 (CanLII), at para 261.

In Borsoi v. Mogg, 2017 ONCJ 112 (CanLII), the child’s vice principal gave evidence about the consequences of chronic absenteeism during the early elementary years: “She told the Court that Kindergarten and Grade 1 set the foundation for literacy development. Students begin reading at this age. Also, the social impact of being around peers at this age is critical. Key habits are learned at this age. Children learn to arrive at school on time, pack a bag, pack a lunch; this routine sets up habits for secondary, post-secondary, work and life.” Extended absences in grade 1 could result in learning gaps in reading concepts as a result of a lack of practice: paras 114 & 118.

In NN v. DL, 2019 ONSC 4913 (CanLII), the child’s school principal testified that when a child arrives late, they miss important announcements, and the ability to settle in and prepare to start the school day with the rest of the class. They may miss foundational language and math work that is done at the beginning of the day, when the students build the basic skills to approach their assignments: para 66.

Recent Case Law

Absenteeism Can Justify a Reversal of Decision-Making and Primary Residence

Nasery v. Kawatra, 2026 ONSC 1005 (CanLII), concerned a six-year-old girl and an eight-year-old boy who were chronically absent from school, and had not seen their father in two years. They initially attended in-person school, but after the mother had an accident, she switched them to virtual school because it was too difficult to manage getting them to school while she was injured: para 140. Attendance was already a problem for both children when they attended in person. By February of his kindergarten year, the boy had missed at least 51.5 days, and was late 18 times. His report card the following year suggested that he “come to school regularly so that he was not missing important learning.” The daughter did not attend kindergarten frequently enough to allow for observations in her first report card: paras 145-147. After the mother enrolled the children in virtual school, their attendance was not consistent and they both had a high number of absences (41 days for the daughter). The mother said the children would close their computers if they were not interested in what was being taught. They had to be coaxed to stay involved: paras 149, 181, & 232.

The children did not attend school during the trial, as they were with the maternal grandmother, who could not get them to attend: para 181.

Justice Jensen found that the children’s needs were not being met in the mother’s care, and their mental health was in jeopardy if they remained there. They needed their father, and they needed to attend school regularly. They should return to in-person schooling, which was unlikely to happen in the mother’s care: paras 179, 181, 183, 188 & 232. The children were placed in the primary care of the father, and the father would have decision-making authority: paras 235-238 & 243-244.

In Grove v. Fahad, 2024 ONSC 2143 (CanLII), interim primary residence was reversed where the mother had a history of neglecting the 9-year-old child’s education, and she had recently withdrawn the child from school altogether with the intention of homeschooling. Justice Somji held it was in the child’s best interests to attend school. The father was better positioned to ensure the child’s attendance, which was a critical aspect of her needs, given her age and stage of development. The child had missed 55 days of school in grade 2, and 48.5 days in grade 3, all of which was during a parenting schedule when the mother had primary care during the school week: paras 26-27. There was sufficient evidence to warrant a change in the interim parenting order. The child would reside with the father during the week, and the mother would have weekend parenting time. The father would have sole decision-making authority on matters of education, while the parties would share decision-making on all other issues: paras 36-38.

In MacKinnon v Davis, 2026 NSSC 2 (CanLII), a recent Nova Scotia decision, a court order had returned 12- and 14-year-old children to the mother’s primary care at the start of the 2024/2025 school year, after spending two years in the father’s care. The father asserted that a material change in circumstances had occurred since the children moved in with the mother. The children’s school attendance had declined in an extreme way that went beyond what would be expected during a transition or adjustment period as they began living with the mother. The children’s grades had declined significantly and/or they did not attend consistently enough to receive grades: para 5(b).

The court found that a material change in circumstances had occurred. The elder child missed 97 out of 193 school days, over 50% of the 2024/2025 school year. Her grades declined from an average of 81% when residing with the father, to 59% in the mother’s care: paras 9-10. The younger child missed 84.5 days, or just over 44% of his school year. He did not receive final grades in English and math due to absenteeism: para 12. He often complained of stomach problems as a reason for missing school, but the child’s doctor had determined the problem was psychosomatic: paras 11-12.

The material changes in the children’s academic engagement and emotional presentation related “in large part to the mother’s parenting practices and / or approach to parenting and / or the home environment”, and specifically, a lack of structure: paras 13 & 17. The court determined it was in the best interests of the children to return to the primary care of the father: paras 72-81.

Cases Where Primary Residence Was Not Changed

In Fehr v. Biloski, 2025 ONSC 2407 (CanLII), the court warned the mother of the need to ensure school attendance, but gave her another chance to do so. The parties had a week about schedule. There were previous interim orders requiring that the children attend school, as the mother had withdrawn the children from school for a month-long period earlier in the year, while simultaneously withholding them from the father: paras 8-13. On the motion, the father was still concerned about the children’s (aged 11 & 7) lack of attendance. He was seeking to change the parenting schedule so the children would be in his care on weekdays, and with the mother on weekends. The mother said the children did not like the school, and did not want to go. She “would not drag them there.” The children were not in school on the day the motion was heard, while they were in the mother’s care: paras 4 & 16-18. The father’s evidence included letters indicating that the children had been absent for 26% of their available learning time. Respectively, they had been absent 24 and 23.5 days out of 92 days that school year, and had arrived late 10 and 7 times. These figures did not include the additional one-month absence referenced above. In an earlier period while the children were in the mother’s sole care, and attending a different school, they were absent 40% of the time: paras 19 & 21.

Justice Brochu opined that the mother “needs to understand the importance of ensuring that the children attend school. She is the parent and needs to assert her role as a parent and bring the children to school, whether they want to go or not”: para 28. The court was reluctant to change the status quo parenting arrangement, but ordered that the children attend school. If they were sick, the mother would provide an explanation and a written note from a health practitioner confirming the illness and/or justification for the absence. In the event the children were absent from school without reasonable justification, the parenting schedule would be modified so the children would be in the father’s care during the week: paras 33-34.

Justice Pazaratz recently observed in R.M. v. D.S. (2026), 2026 ONSC 1795 (CanLII), that when a primary resident parent says they can’t “force” their child to attend parenting time with the other parent, or to attend school, “it raises broader questions about parenting skills and insight.” In that case, the 10-year-old daughter was missing about 45 school days per year, not including late arrivals. She was also resisting contact with the father. The father claimed the mother allowed both children to stay up late on their electronic devices. In the morning, they would tell her they didn’t feel well enough to go to school, and the mother would let them stay home. The mother acknowledged it was a challenge getting the daughter to school. Although she was a teacher herself, she resisted the father’s suggestion that missing so much school could jeopardize the daughter’s academic performance: para 46.

Justice Pazaratz also questioned the child’s judgment, asking how the court can entrust the child “to have complete discretion about seeing her father – when her judgment about attending school seems so immature and shallow.” The issue of the father’s parenting time was adjourned on consent, pending efforts by both parties to arrange for reunification counselling: paras 46 & 91-92.

In A.G. v. J.W. (2025), 2025 ONCJ 634 (CanLII), the parties had shared parenting of the five-year-old child, but the mother complained that when the child started school in the father’s city (Elliot Lake), that effectively ended her week-about parenting time in Sault Ste. Marie. On the motion, each party was seeking primary residence: paras 3, 6-8, & 16. Among several other concerns, the mother raised that the child had missed 48 days of school. The father claimed that the child never attended daycare before starting junior kindergarten, and this was the first time she was exposed to other children and germs, so she was frequently sick: paras 20 & 37. School attendance was not the court’s primary focus in the decision, and Justice Mendes accepted the father’s explanation that the child was often ill. However, “this year should be the exception in terms of the child’s high absence rate. It is the court’s expectation that the child will consistently and regularly attend school and not miss days due to minor sniffles.” The court ordered that the child reside primarily with the father: paras 60 & 64.

*with thanks to Kayleigh Pink for her suggestions and edits.

This blog is informational only and should not be relied on as legal advice.